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ABSTRACT

1.

The Internet is by all accounts an incredible success, but in
spite or maybe because of this success, its deficiencies have
come under increasing scrutiny and triggered calls for new
architectures to succeed it. Those architectures will, however, face a formidable incumbent in the Internet, and their
ability to ultimately replace it is likely to depend equally
on technical superiority as on economic factors. The goal
of this paper is to start developing models that can help
provide a quantitative understanding of a competition between the Internet and a new system, and show what factors
affect it most strongly. A model for the adoption of competing network technologies by individual users is formulated
and solved. It accounts for both the intrinsic value of each
technology and the positive externalities derived from their
respective numbers of adopters. Using this model, different
configurations are explored and possible outcomes characterized. More importantly, configurations are identified where
small differences in the attributes of either technology can
lead to vastly different results. The paper provides initial
results that can help identify parameters that significantly
affect the likelihood of success of new network technologies.

Advances in technology often see newer and better solutions replacing older ones. Networking is no exception, and
the Internet displaced the traditional phone network as the
de facto communication infrastructure, for example. And it
also displaced more direct competitors, packet data network
technologies such as ATM, Frame Relay, SNA and others.
But this displacement took a long time. In other words,
technical superiority alone is no guarantee for success, especially in the presence of a strong incumbent. A large body
of work has indeed been devoted to this issue, but networking technologies exacerbate this phenomenon because of the
many factors that affect their value, and in particular the
benefits of a large installed base. The Internet itself provides a perfect example of such complex interactions, with
its long-standing “migration” from IPv4 to IPv6. In spite of a
known need (the eventual exhaustion of IPv4 addresses) and
intrinsic technical advantages (security, mobility, etc.), uncertainties regarding technology maturity and stability and
difficulties in ensuring a transparent transition for existing
services, have stymied all large-scale conversion attempts.
Could this have been predicted, and were there steps that
could have been taken to remedy the situation and hasten a
transition that most if not all view as positive and ultimately
necessary? In this paper, we propose a model to study both
the dynamics of diffusion of new network technologies in the
presence of an incumbent, and their eventual equilibrium
adoption levels.
We start with a model of individual user’s utility and build
an aggregate diffusion model that is consistent with individual rational decision-making in adopting network technologies. In our model, users can be heterogeneous in the way
they value the services deployed on top of any network technology. The drawback of modeling individual level decisionmaking and user heterogeneity is that it makes the diffusion
model complex. However, the cost of this complexity is outweighed by two benefits. First, the model allows us to understand both individual-level and system-level dynamics,
and explore how small changes in system parameters can
affect individual decisions and ultimately lead to very different system-level outcomes. Second, the model allows us
to identify and explain interesting phenomena such as the
presence of multiple equilibria and the potential for both
network technologies to coexist.
Although preliminary, we have four main findings to report from our initial analysis:
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INTRODUCTION

• In many instances, multiple equilibrium adoption levels may exist for the same set of parameters (i.e., price,
quality levels, etc). The specific equilibrium attained
depends on the initial condition for the diffusion process. Stated differently, the equilibrium adoption levels
depend on entry timing of the new network technology.
• It is possible for both the incumbent and entrant technologies to coexist in equilibrium, even in the absence
of gateways or converters.
• Even though the entrant may seem to be diffusing well,
it is often doomed to fail if its growth rate is slower
than that of the incumbent. Thus, the observer can
be misled by the apparent steady pace of diffusion of
a new network technology, and should closely monitor
relative growth rates and network benefits.
• When multiple equilibria exist, we observe that small
changes in parameters can sometimes have a big impact on the equilibrium adoption levels. Thus, decision
makers have to be particularly cautious with pricing,
entry timing and other deployment decisions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
discusses prior work and positions our work in the literature.
Section 3 introduces our model and problem formulation.
Section 4 characterizes equilibrium adoption levels, while
Section 5 provides a numerical study of diffusion dynamics
involving two competing network technologies. We discuss
the limitations of this study and conclude the paper with
remarks on future work in Section 6.

2.

RELATED WORK

There are two streams of work relevant to our study. The
first relates to the literature on adoption of incompatible
technologies. The second relates to the literature on new
product/technology diffusion. We discuss both below.
Adoption of incompatible technologies: Adoption of
incompatible technologies in the presence of network externalities has been treated in a number of prior works, e.g., [4,
3]). When technologies are incompatible, users of a technology can only reach other users of the same technology and,
as a result, the value a user derives from a technology is a
function of the size of its installed base (these are referred
to as network benefits or network externalities). The main
focus of the literature has been on the impact of converters
that help make one technology partially compatible with
the other. The key finding of these works is that network
externalities can often lead to multiple equilibria and that
converters have a significant impact on equilibrium adoption
levels. A recent paper by Joseph et al. [7] extends the results
in the context of new network architectures. These papers
consider static models and do not model the exact convergence path that leads to any equilibrium. As a result, they
do not allow the observer to infer how the diffusion process
selects one of several equilibria and also make it difficult to
devise dynamic policies.
New Product Diffusion: Modeling the diffusion of new
products and technologies has a long tradition in Marketing [1] and is still an active area of research (see [8] for an
overview of this literature). The vast majority of these models focus on aggregate adoption dynamics without explicitly
modeling individual decision making processes. The advantage of the approach is that it results in relatively simple

diffusion models that can then be used to study dynamic
policies (e.g., dynamic pricing). Unfortunately, these aggregate models do not shed sufficient light on the decision
processes that lead to certain system dynamics or the exact
mechanism through which various decision variables (pricing, quality, advertising, etc.) impact adoption decisions. A
few models have focused on individual-level adoption (for example [2, 6]). These models provide far greater insight into
the mechanism through which rational individual decisionmaking results in aggregate system dynamics. Given the
complexity of these models, much of the progress to date
has been in settings with one single technology. In contrast,
the adoption of new network technologies and architectures
is often influenced by the presence of incumbents. In order
to fully understand the drivers of their success and failures,
it is important to model the role of the incumbent.
Prior work reveals two themes. First, while the literature on adoption of incompatible technologies has modeled
network externalities and demonstrated it can result in multiple equilibria, these models are static and do not provide
deep insight on the convergence process or path. Two, the
diffusion literature has primarily focused on aggregate models and the few individual-level models have been for single technologies diffusing in isolation. Because new network
architectures are often deployed in the presence of incumbents, understanding diffusion of new network architectures
requires that we model dynamic processes and incorporate
the role of incumbents. This is the question we turn to now.

3.

PROBLEM FORMULATION

This section introduces our model for studying adoption
dynamics between two competing network technologies.

3.1

User’s Decision Process

Consider two network technologies, labeled 1 and 2, representing the incumbent and entrant respectively: for example, IPv4 versus IPv6 or the current Internet versus a cleanslate alternative. The quality of technology i is denoted by
qi > 0 and its price pi > 0, for i = 1, 2. We assume a fixed
population of N users, with Ni the number of users adopting technology i = 1, 2. The proportion of users who adopt
i
technology i is denoted by xi = N
, with x = (x1 , x2 ) ∈ S,
N
where
S = {(x1 , x2 ) | x1 + x2 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1}
denotes the set of possible adoption levels. An end user’s
surplus from technology i is modeled as
Ui (θ, x) = θqi + v(xi ) − pi

(1)

θqi is the standalone benefit that the user obtains from technology i, with θ ∈ [0, 1] being an individual preference parameter that reflects how much the user values the technology. The value of θ varies across users capturing their
heterogeneity. Individual values of θ are private, but their
distribution, denoted by F (θ), is known. v(xi ) ≥ 0 denotes
the positive network externalities or benefits that the user
derives from other adopters of technology i. These benefits increase with the number of adopters, so that v(xi ) is
a nondecreasing function with v(0) = 0. There exist several techniques to estimate the user-specific weights in utility functions (e.g., θ in our model). One highly appealing
option is the use of conjoint analysis. In conjoint analysis,

survey respondents are presented with options that simultaneously vary two or more attributes of a product/service
and are asked to indicate their preferences among these options. Respondents’ preference orderings are then used to
estimate the utility weights. We refer the interested reader
to [5] for a detailed survey.
We assume each user is a rational decision maker in that
she chooses technology i only if it provides a surplus that is
both positive (Individual Rationality constraint) and higher
than that of the other technology (Incentive Compatibility
constraint). In other words, a user chooses
8
< no technology if Ui < 0 for all i,
technology 1
if U1 > 0 and U1 > U2 ,
: technology 2
if U2 > 0 and U2 > U1 .
To determine the number of adopters of the two technologies, we characterize indifference points that identify user
preference values associated with changes in their decision
to adopt either technology. Specifically, θi0 (x), i ∈ {1, 2} denote thresholds where users switch from deriving negative
surplus to deriving positive surplus from technology i, i.e.,
for a given x, θi0 (x) is a point such that Ui (θi0 , x) = 0. Similarly, θ21 (x) corresponds to the threshold where users switch
from preferring technology 1 to preferring technology 2, i.e.,
θ21 (x) satisfies U1 (θ21 , x) = U2 (θ21 , x). By definition, any user
with preference value θ > θi0 derives positive surplus from
technology i. And a user with θ > θ21 derives greater surplus
from technology 2 than technology 1 (assuming q2 > q1 ).
Given these definitions, consider the following two subsets
of users defined in [0,1],
Θ1 (x)

=

{θ ∈ [0, 1] | U1 (θ, x) ≥ U2 (θ, x), U1 (θ, x) > 0},

Θ2 (x)

=

{θ ∈ [0, 1] | U2 (θ, x) > U1 (θ, x), U2 (θ, x) > 0}.

Under the assumption that the functions Ui (θi , x), i = 1, 2,
are continuous, both subsets are easily shown to be connected intervals, so that if we denote as Hi (x), i = 1, 2, the
number of users in each subset, and further assume that F (θ)
is continuous, we have the following expression for Hi (x)
Hi (x) = F (bi ) − F (ai )
where [ai , bi ] = closure of Θi (x).
Equilibrium adoption levels can then be characterized by:
x∗i = Hi (x∗ ) for i = 1, 2.

(2)

In other words, at equilibrium, the number of users for whom
it is individually rational and incentive compatible to choose
technology i equals the current number of adopters of technology i. Based on this formulation, our goal is to characterize, as a function of the exogenous system parameters
pi , qi , i = 1, 2, the equilibrium adoption levels, i.e., the fixed
points of Eqn. (2), and the dynamics leading to them.

3.2

Diffusion dynamics

Characterizing the dynamics of technology adoption towards equilibrium, calls for defining the decision making
process of users. Suppose that at time ‘t’, the “current”
technology adoption values, xi (t), i = 1, 2, are announced
to all users. Assuming this information is available to the
entire population, each user could individually evaluate her
utility for the two technologies and immediately make the
corresponding adoption decision. Under these assumptions,
(Hi (x(t)) − xi (t)) would be the proportion of users that proceed to adopt(disadopt) technology i at t. Users’ adoption

decisions may, however, be delayed for a number of reasons;
e.g., not all users may learn the current adoption levels at
the same time and they may react to this information at different rates. In order to capture these effects, the diffusion
rate of user decisions at time t can be modeled by
dxi (t)
= (Hi (x(t) − xi (t))P (t)
dt

(3)

where P (t) is the expected conditional probability that an
individual who has not yet adopted technology i will do so at
time t. P (t) is analogous to the hazard rate in individuallevel diffusion models (e.g., see [6]). We assume that the
propensity of individuals to adopt does not change with
time, i.e., P (t) = γ. With this assumption, the diffusion
rate at time t is given by:
`
´
dxi (t)
= γ Hi (x(t)) − xi (t) , i ∈ {1, 2}.
dt

(4)

One aspect of our model needs further clarification. Specifically, the model identifies the rate of technology adoption,
but not which users are making the change. To preserve consistency with user preferences, we assume that in our target
population the users that are the first to adopt (or disadopt)
technology i are those that stand to benefit the most from
it. This ensures that at all times the sets of users having
adopted either technology are consistent, and correspond to
blocks of users with contiguous preferences.

4.

CHARACTERIZING EQUILIBRIA

As outlined in the previous section, the dynamics of technology adoption in our model involve both identifying possible equilibria and characterizing how they are reached.
We start by exploring the first aspect as specified through
Eqn. (2), and for that purpose introduce the following assumptions:
• θ has a uniform distribution over [0, 1]. This assumption is for tractability and is common in the literature.
Although it affects the magnitude of the equilibrium,
it does not qualitatively affect the results [2].
• v(xi ) is linear in xi , i.e., v(xi ) = xi . This is consistent with Metcalfe’s law and commonly used in the
literature (e.g., [4]). Note that the maximum network
benefit is normalized to 1 and all other benefits and
costs are expressed in the same unit.
• The entrant technology is of higher quality, i.e., q2 >
q1 . In other words, the technical superiority of technology 2 affords its users greater intrinsic benefits.
• pi > 0, qi > 0, i = 1, 2.

4.1

Identification of Hi (x)

Recall from Eqn. (2) that equilibria are determined by
the functions Hi (x), i = 1, 2, which themselves depend on
the values of the indifference points identifying the preference levels at which users derive positive utility from either
technology (θi0 (x), i = 1, 2) and prefer technology 2 over
technology 1 (θ21 (x) – recall our assumption that q2 > q1 ).
The corresponding conditions are given by
Ui (θ, x) > 0
U2 (θ, x) > U1 (θ, x)

if θ > θi0 (x)
if θ > θ21 (x).

(5)
(6)

Table 1: Partitions characterizing Hi (x)
θ10 ≥ θ20
θ10 < θ20
Region condition
Region
condition
R1
θ20 ≤ 0
R4
θ21 ≤ 0,
0 ≤ θ10
R2
0 < θ20 < 1
R5
0 < θ21 < 1,
θ10 ≤ 0
R3
1 ≤ θ20
R6
0 < θ21 < 1, 0 < θ10 < 1
R7
1 ≤ θ21 ,
θ10 ≤ 0
R8
1 ≤ θ21 ,
0 < θ10 < 1
R9
1 ≤ θ21 ,
1 ≤ θ10
Eqn. (5) indicates that any user with θ > θi0 gets positive
surplus from adopting technology i, and Eqn. (6) implies
that she prefers technology 2 over technology 1 if θ > θ21
and prefers technology 1 otherwise.
Setting Ui (θ, x) = 0, we get
θ10 (x) =
θ20 (x) =

p1 − x1
q1
p2 − x2
q2

(7)
(8)

(x1 − x2 ) + (p2 − p1 )
.
(q2 − q1 )

Table 3: Conditions for a valid equilibrium
candidate
(0,0)
(1,0)
(0,1)
1 −q1
( p1−q
, 0)
1

(0,

Similarly, setting U1 (θ, x) = U2 (θ, x) gives
θ21 (x) =

Figure 1: Partitions

p2 −q2
)
1−q2

x∗R5

To simplify notation, we use from now on θi0 and θ21 instead
of θi0 (x) and θ21 (x). After simple manipulations, we get
q2
θ21 − θ10 =
(θ20 − θ10 ),
q2 − q1
q1
θ21 − θ20 =
(θ20 − θ10 )
q2 − q1

x∗R6

and have the following
result about the location of θ21 .
Lemma 4.1. If θ10 < θ20 , then θ21 > θ20 > θ10 . If θ10 ≥ θ20 ,
then θ21 ≤ θ20 ≤ θ10 .
Using the above lemma, we obtain expressions for Hi (x):
 1
[θ2 ][0,1] − [θ10 ][0,1]
if θ10 < θ20
H1 (x) =
0
otherwise

H2 (x) =

(10)
1 − [θ21 ][0,1]
1 − [θ20 ][0,1]

Computing equilibria

The computation of equilibria proceeds in two steps. The
first involves identifying candidate equilibria from solving
Eqn. (2) in each of the nine regions where it takes potentially different expressions. The second consists of validating

2

1

2 −q2
max{0, p2 − q2 } < p1−q
< min{p2 , 1}
2
p2
p1
1 p2 −q2
(
)
≥
−
q
1−q
q
q
2

2

1

1−(p2 −p1 )
} < x∗1 R
2
5
1−(p
−p
2
1 )+q2 −q1
x∗1 R < min{1,
}
2
5
0 < x∗1 R ≤ min{p1 , 1}, 0 < x∗2 R

max{p1 ,

6

6

these candidate equilibria by determining if they indeed belong to the region associated with the expression of Hi (x)
used to compute them. The results of the first phase of
this computation are reported in Table 2 for each region, together with the corresponding expressions for Hi (x). Note
the simple expressions for Hi (x), which imply that the differential equation of Eqn. (4) can be readily solved to characterize the dynamics of technology adoption. For ease of
notation in Table 2, we denote the candidate equilibrium in
R5 by x∗R5 = (x∗1 R5 , 1 − x∗1 R5 ) and the candidate in R6 by
x∗R6 = (x∗1 R6 , x∗2 R6 ). The specific values are:

if θ10 < θ20
otherwise

where x[a,b] is the projection of x into the interval [a, b], i.e.,
is equal to x inside and either a or b outside. As the preference levels θ of all users lie in [0, 1], Eqn. (10), fully determine Hi (x), albeit with possibly different expressions based
on the outcome of the projections. Hence, our next step is
to partition the (x1 , x2 ) plane into regions where Hi (x) has
a unique expression. Although somewhat tedious, this can
be readily achieved from combining Eqns. (7) to (9) with
Eqn. (10). The resulting partitioning is illustrated in Figure 1 that identifies nine distinct regions. These regions are
further characterized in Table 1 in terms on their boundaries
expressed as conditions on the indifference points. Armed
with explicit, albeit multiple (one per region) expressions for
Hi (x), we can solve Eqn. (2) and identify equilibria.

4.2

2

1 −q1
max{0, p1 − q1 } < p1−q
< min{p1 , 1}
1
1 −q1
q2 − q1 − (p2 − p1 ) < p1−q

2

(9)



conditions
p1 − q1 > 0 and p2 − q2 > 0
p1 ≤ 1 and (q2 − p2 ) − (q1 − p1 ) ≤ 1
p2 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ p1 − p2 qq1 + qq1

x∗1 R5

=

p2 − p1 − 1
q2 − q1 − 2
q2
p − p2 + 1 −
q1 1

x∗1 R6

=

x∗2 R6

= 1−

q1 + 1 +
p1
+
q1

q2
q1

„

−

p1
q1
q2 − q11

«
1
− 1 x∗1 R6 .
q1

(11)
(12)
(13)

The second step of the computation, validating the equilibria listed in Table 2 by verifying that they belong to their
respective region, can be carried out using again Eqns. (7)
to (9) together with the conditions specified in Table 1. The
resulting list of valid equilibria together with the conditions
required for these validations are provided in Table 3. To
illustrate how these conditions can be derived, we briefly
∗
. For x∗R5 to be an equilibrium, it
sketch the process for xR
5
should satisfy
C1 :
C2 :

x1 + (p2 − p1 ) − (q2 − q1 ) < x2 < x1 + (p2 − p1 )
x 1 ≥ p1 .

Using the expression for x∗1 R5 given in Eqn. (11) in conditions C1 and C2 yields the conditions given in Table 3.

Region
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9

Table 2: Candidate equilibria
H2 (x)
H2 (x) = 1
2
H1 (x) = 0
H2 (x) = 1 − p2q−x
2
H2 (x) = 0
H1 (x) = 0
H2 (x) = 1
2 −x1 )
2 −x1 )
H1 (x) = p2 −pq12−(x
H2 (x) = 1 − p2 −pq12−(x
−q1
−q1
p2 −p1 −(x2 −x1 )
p2 −p1 −(x2 −x1 )
p1 −x1
H1 (x) =
− q1
H2 (x) = 1 −
q2 −q1
q2 −q1
H1 (x) = 1
1
H2 (x) = 0
H1 (x) = 1 − p1q−x
1
H1 (x) = 0
H1 (x)

Table 3 not only identifies valid equilibria, but it also indicates that there exist conditions under which both technologies can coexist in equilibrium. It is interesting to note
that this is realized without the presence of converters. In
contrast, in a similar scenario without converters, [7] finds
that only one technology exists in equilibrium and that there
exists a tipping point where one technology takes over the
market. This is because their model assumes a homogeneous
population of users. Heterogeneity in the user population
adds complexity but highlights a finding of potential interest
to a policy maker, namely, that there are many cases where
both technologies can survive. When cast in the context of
network technologies, this can mean significant inefficiencies
if it calls for introducing and maintaining two versions of
new and existing service, e.g., an IPv4 and an IPv6 version.
Clearly, the availability of gateways, something we plan to
incorporate next, will affect this conclusion. However, cumbersome or expensive gateways, as is currently the case between IPv4 and IPv6, should introduce little changes, and
as shown in [7], the availability of gateways can both hasten
or slow-down the deployment of a new technology.
It should be noted that while Table 3 identifies valid equilibria, it does not specify which one is selected for combinations of parameters that satisfy more than one of the validity
conditions specified in the table. Exploring this aspect together with the extent to which different outcomes can be
realized through small changes in configuration parameters
is a topic we explore further in the next section.

5.

TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION DYNAMICS

This section investigates several scenarios that illustrate
the broad range of dynamics and outcomes that the model
allows us to elucidate. Throughout the section, technology
1 is the incumbent and technology 2 the entrant, which as
we recall is assumed to be of higher quality, i.e., q2 > q1 .
Because of the wide range of parameter combinations that
can be considered, we focus our investigation on scenarios
of most practical interest. Specifically,
• 0 < x1 (0− ) < x∗1 only and x2 (0− ) = 0, where x∗1 only is
a “stable” equilibrium if only technology 1 exists in the
market. In other words, technology 1 alone would survive but has not yet achieved its equilibrium penetration at t = 0, which is when technology 2 is introduced
with a penetration level of 0.
• When technology 2 is introduced at time t = 0, it is
priced so that it can start gaining market share. In
other words, θ20 (x1 (0− ), 0) < 1 and θ21 (x1 (0− ), 0) < 1,

Candidate x∗
(0, 1)
2 −q2
(0, p1−q
)
2
(0, 0)
(0, 1)
(x∗1 R5 , 1 − x∗1 R5 )
(x∗1 R6 , x∗2 R6 )
(1,0)
1 −q1
( p1−q
, 0)
1
(0,0)

which then implies p2 < q2 and p2 − p1 − (q2 − q1 ) <
−x1 (0− ), respectively.
Note that from Table 3, p2 < q2 implies that (0, 0) is not a
valid equilibrium. Hence, our choice of pi and qi ensures that
at least one of the two technologies survives at equilibrium.
Our first investigation highlights sensitivity to pricing of
technology 2. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 2, we
see that for the same values of p1 = 1.01, q1 = 2.95 and
q2 = 5.5, minor differences in p2 result in drastically different outcomes that range from either technology being the
sole survivor (left and right-most curves), to both technology coexisting in equilibrium (center curve). Of particular
interest is the fact that all three scenarios appear qualitatively very similar, i.e., with both technologies experiencing healthy growth after the introduction of technology 2.
These qualitative similarities notwithstanding, differences in
growth rates between the two technologies are responsible
for the vastly different end-results.
The existence of a pricing combination that allows both
technologies to survive is also of interest, as is the fact that
price alone, and not the initial penetration of technology
1, determines the outcome in these examples. Finally, it
is also worth pointing out that in the scenario where technology 2 eventually eliminates technology 1, this result is
realized at the cost of a lower overall market penetration
than feasible with technology 1 alone. In other words, the
higher quality but higher price technology failed to attract
some of the “low-valuation” users. Further reduction in technology 2’s price can help increase its penetration among the
low-valuation users. This may or may not be profitable.
Our second example, shown in Figure 3, identifies a scenario (p1 = 1.2, q1 = 2.95, q2 = 5.1 and p2 = 2.55), where
unlike Figure 2, the final equilibrium depends on the penetration of technology 1 when technology 2 is introduced.
This highlights that when technology 2 is marginally more
attractive than technology 1, network externalities can be
dominant in determining the outcome. Thus, the timing of
introduction of technology 2 can be crucial in deciding its
eventual success. As in Figure 2, both scenarios start with
qualitatively similar behaviors, which makes it that much
harder for the policy maker to predict the evolution of technology adoption, unless careful attention is paid to the relative growth rates of each technology. An additional point of
interest in this configuration is that it includes three equilibria, (0.4912, 0.2686), (0.8974, 0) and (0, 0.6220), but the one
that involves both technologies coexisting is unstable. As a
result, only one survives in any stable equilibrium.
Figure 4 presents our last scenario (p1 = 0.5, p2 = 5.2, q1 =

Figure 2: Effects of price changes on diffusion dynamics

Figure 3: On the impact of initial penetration
0.3 and q2 = 9.6), which illustrates yet another possible behavior for technology adoption. The figure shows that depending on the initial penetration of technology 1, the equilibrium sees either the survival of only technology 2, albeit
at a relatively low penetration (around 0.5), or the coexistence of both technologies with a combined penetration of
a 100%. Both the differences in eventual penetration and
the presence of a sharp demarcation line between the two
regions are of interest. This is an instance, where the sufficient initial penetration of technology 1 ensures not only
its survival, but preserves its ability to continue serving the
needs of the “low end” of the market, which the better but
pricier technology 2 cannot satisfy.

Figure 4: Coexistence vs. market penetration

6.

CONCLUSION

The model developed in this paper is a first step towards
better understanding what affects the outcome of competition between an incumbent network technology and an
entrant. It accounts for network externalities and heterogeneity in how individual users make technology adoption

decisions, and captures both adoption dynamics and their
eventual outcome. In spite of the model’s relative simplicity, it revealed various issues of potential interest in assessing
the likelihood of success of a new networking technology
There are many directions in which this initial work can
and should be extended, and we mention a few. A first is to
include gateways or converters that offer some level of compatibility between the two technologies. Another less obvious extension involves developing pricing strategies. These
could be static and seek to identify the optimal timing and
pricing of the new technology to maximize profit1 . Even
more interesting are dynamic pricing strategies to maximize
the odds of survival or profit of each technology.
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Note that this calls for introducing a cost and revenue model for
each producer of technology.

